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The question ‘What is bio-ethics?’ is asking about the nature of a science emerged only 
recently1. Each discipline that contributes knowledge to it has a tendency to conceive of it 
in its own image: Doctors consider it a matter of clinical decision; politicians a 
democratic process; lawyers a legal development; theologians a consequence of 
Revelation; sociologists a social fact; and biologists as biologically determined. 
Philosophy claims it, because it is, beyond all these specialist determinations, essentially 
ethics: ‘the ethics that concerns our relations to the biosphere’2. 
 
It can be divided in various ways. The most general way divides it according to the 
proximity of the biosphere, which is either in, shared with or around the person.  
 
1. The biosphere is in a person’s body: problems relating to health and illness, sexuality 
and reproduction, life and death pertain to medical ethics.  
2. The biosphere is shared with the person: problems in relation to food and food-safety 
pertain to consumer ethics, whereas problems relating to animals pertain to animal 
ethics.  
3. The biosphere is around us as our general habitat: problems relating to pollution, bio-
diversity, climatic changes, population growth and -decline pertain to environmental 
ethics. 
 
Bio-ethics is essentially ethics, but what is ethics? The Greek ethos, from which we have 
‘ethics’, means ‘what is usually done’, or what is done according to custom. The Romans 
translated it with mos or moris, which has given us our ‘morals’, and which, perhaps 
because Christianity took root and political authority from the Roman tradition, has a 
clearer and more authoritarian ring in most people’s ears. Ethics, however, conserves the 
original sense of ‘what it is considered appropriate to do’, or what ‘we’ consider it 
appropriate to do. Therefore ethics can be defined as ‘what we consider appropriate to 
do’. 
 
On face value this definition seems relativistic3. Ethics, in fact, is relative to us in how we 
deal with it, because we are ourselves involved in it. It also, however, obliges us, because 
we cannot escape our involvement. We always already consider something appropriate, 
and find ourselves challenged by what others consider appropriate to do. What is truly 
appropriate, however, i.e. what is good, is difficult to know. Plato prescribes 
heartbreaking measures, such as dialectics, love or death, as ways to know the good, but 
he does not pretend that even the knowledge obtained by their means can exempt us from 
the relativism of ethical life in this world, in anything but our own minds. 
 
I will offer three sets of reflections on the definition of ethics before I move on to 
consider their implications for bio-ethics and its concrete development in Ireland. If 
ethics concerns what it is appropriate to do, we must firstly reflect on what it is to do 
something. Secondly we must give some thought to what it means to consider something 
as appropriate, and thirdly we will have to address what we mean, when we say ‘we’. I 
hope by this to make clear, not only what bio-ethics is, but also how or why it is relevant, 
and to what extent. 
 
 
1. First reflection on ethics: What it is to do something 
 
We can do something in two ways:  
 
1. Either by coincidence, as when we have made a mess of something and did not plan 
to do it;  
2. Or we can do it deliberately, as when we purposefully try to achieve it.  
 
In fact these two ways of doing something are complementary parts of any act because it 
is impossible in fact, but not in theory, to separate what we want to do from what we 
actually manage to do. We can also say that this is because doing, (involving intention 
and choice), is always doing something (the reality of what is done). 
 
It is generally thought that we have moral responsibility only for what we intend to do, 
i.e. what we do deliberately, whereas we have legal responsibility also for what we 
actually manage to make of it, i.e. what we do by coincidence. In reality, however, our 
actions aren’t made up exclusively of our intentions, nor would they be our actions if we 
did not intentionally bring them about. When we do something, we have chosen to do it, 
but ‘it’ might turn out quite differently from what we expected, because ‘it’ is not only 
dependent on our intentions, but also on what comes of it. There is no doing without the 
combination of intention and achievement. For example: I didn’t intend to hit the 
pedestrian, when I drove to work. What I was doing was precisely ‘to go to work’, but it 
also happened that I hit a pedestrian. If I merely had intended to drive to work, I would 
never have got into the car. But driving on its own wouldn’t have got me there either. I 
must carry the legal responsibility for what I in fact did, and the moral responsibility to 
the extent that the accident was my fault. Quite likely what I intended to do, and was 
justified in expecting I could do, was something entirely other than what in fact came out 
of it. Yet it wouldn’t have happened, if it hadn’t been for my intention. The ‘principle of 
double effect’ relies on this distinction between what is intended and what is obtained. It 
also is this distinction which accounts for the distinction between ethics and law. 
 
 
2. Second reflection on ethics: What it is to consider something appropriate 
 
We consider something appropriate in three distinct, but inseparable ways: 
 
1. Firstly, we consider something appropriate on the private level, when we accept it as 
a maxim for our actions.  
2. Secondly, we consider something appropriate locally, when we think its maxim is fit 
for acceptance by all involved, ‘within the house’, for example, or ‘within the 
scientific community’.  
3. Thirdly, we consider something appropriate generally, when we imply that its maxim 
‘ought to be’ accepted by all as a general law, and hence could not justifiably be 
prohibited as a maxim for actions. This is the ‘missionary’ dimension of considering 
something appropriate, which it is impossible to avoid. 
 
In fact these three ways are three dimensions of any consideration of something as 
appropriate, because any act of any kind can be appreciated by everyone, even if it should 
not always be. 
 
Private acceptance may at first not seem to engage someone in ethical behavior at all. 
After all, ‘I’m only doing this, and it is nobody else’s business’. But the difficulty arises 
the moment I’m trying to express what I am doing. Then I have to express it as an 
instance of a general rule, as an action of a kind, a kind that I can consider appropriate. 
Someone else may consider this kind of action inappropriate, or object that my action is 
of another kind which he considers inappropriate. If he does, we have an ethical problem, 
as ‘what we consider appropriate’ no longer is unproblematic. If I can convince him that 
my doings are not his business or if I can successfully ignore his complaints, the problem 
fades. To the degree, however, where I cannot, the problem remains. To solve it, we must 
agree to hold something in common that ‘we’ consider appropriate. 
 
Private ethical decisions, therefore, can, in so far as others feel concerned by them, have 
social and universal dimensions. As we are born into a house, a family, a tribe, a group or 
a society, we grow up with the knowledge of what is and what it is not considered 
appropriate to do within these communities, and we have to take our own stand in 
relation to them. When we do so, we contribute to their development, because we 
contribute to them what we consider to be appropriate. Hence we are by our very actions 
and thoughts ethical decision-makers. This is why the three dimensions of considering 
something appropriate cannot be separated even as they remain distinct. 
 
 
3. Third reflection on ethics: What we mean when we say ‘we’ 
 
Because of the inseparability of the three dimensions of considering something 
appropriate, it is of the essence of ethics, what we mean when we say ‘we’. When we by 
the term ‘we’ refer merely to the majestic plural of myself, we might be granted right of 
way. For example when what we claim is either just, in the interest of those whom it 
concerns, or simply establishing a sorely needed order with authority. If neither of these 
is the case, we will be regarded as tyrants, madmen or egoists. When we, however, by the 
term ‘we’ refer to our local community, it means that we have taken the interests and 
points of view of every member of the community into consideration before we formulate 
what ‘we consider to be appropriate’. Finally, when we by the term ‘we’ refer to the 
universal community, we should in principle have considered the claim we make from 
every possible angle. We learn gradually to refer to this ‘we’, as we have to take on 
political responsibility and are made to ponder the damage caused to some by a mere 
local use of ‘we’.  
 
It seems to be up to us who we are. When we say: ‘we know that it is wrong to kill a 
human being’ we refer, by the expression ‘we’, either to the majestic ‘we’, to the local 
‘we’, or to the universal ‘we’. The ‘we’ we can justifiably refer to empowers us to speak 
in its name and invests us with its power. We can, however, usurp this power by 
pretending to speak in its name. This is when we don’t really take into consideration what 
others think, but pretend to do so in order to lend our claim more credibility. In a certain 
sense, saying ‘we’ always includes the pretension to speak for more than one self, and 
hence it is sometimes pretentious. We can refer to a pretended ‘we’ and ‘get away with it’ 
to the extent that those who disagree don’t voice their disagreement. We leave others free 
to speak in our name as long as it is not vital for us that other people know we think 
otherwise, or as long as we are not able to make our claim heard. What ‘we’ consider 
appropriate is therefore not beyond the power-balance of a given society, only what is 
good, is. Problems of ethics, in fact, are always what you could also call ‘social’ 
problems. 
 
The ethical problem is built into all communication and all knowledge, because we have 
to speak as ‘we’ all the time. ‘We know that the earth is round’ for example, is a rallying 
of all of us, to know that the earth is round. ‘We don’t accept breaches of human rights’ is 
a call to all of us not to accept breaches of human rights. These propositions are both 
proposed for us to accept. But they exemplify two types: those that concern what is, and 
those that concern what to do. In general discourse the types are interwoven to the point 
of inseparability. But when one engages in arguing, disentangling them becomes 
necessary and the means by which a community, so to speak, reconstitutes itself. In so far 
as the argument is about what to do, it is ethical in nature, and what the community 
reconstitutes by its negotiations is its ethics. 
 
One way of structuring a debate about ethics is to discuss our ‘ethical principles’. Ethical 
principles are proposals of general rules for life in common. The ‘golden rule’: ‘do unto 
others as you would like them to do to you’ is probably the ethical principle most 
commonly appealed to. It is expressed in Kant’s Categorical Imperative. The utilitarian 
principle of acting purposefully to promote ‘the highest degree of happiness for the 
greatest possible number’, is also a commonly accepted standard. Various theories of 
what acting well means (egoism, authoritarianism, natural law theory, ethics of care, and 
virtue theory) can be discussed to clarify what we mean. This helps ease frustration 
because it makes us more capable of contributing our own point of view in a constructive 
way.  
 
 
4. Bio-ethics 
 
Bio-ethics, i.e. what we consider appropriate to do in relation to the biosphere – whether 
in our bodies, in our sharing of it, or in our natural habitat – is negotiated in the same way 
as ethics generally is. It concerns our doings in relation to the biosphere; it concerns what 
we consider it appropriate to do, in its private, social and universal dimension; and it 
depends on how we identify as ‘we’. It has been discussed very much recently because 
technology has confronted us with choices for which there is no well established 
precedence. Also: the consequences of these choices seemed to concern everyone: From 
IVF to GMO’s, bio-ethics concerns all because the biosphere is one and the same for 
everyone, even if it is vast.  
 
There are some signs that bio-ethics already has peaked in Europe. After a decade of 
difficult and public negotiations of private, social and international matters – some of 
which Ireland might face unwillingly in the near future – humiliations and triumphs have 
evened out, and the general feeling that life is not perfect, and that our decisions aren’t 
either, has taken over. Other problems, moreover, have taken centre-stage since the 
eleventh of September 2001. The most disturbing ethical problem we will have to deal 
with in the near future is xenophobia. 
 
This is not to say that the bio-ethical problems aren’t important any longer. They have to 
be addressed to the extent that it is necessary, i.e. to the extent that they are controversial. 
There are generally speaking three institutional ways of facilitating the ‘restoration’ of 
the ethics of a society: by education, by politics, and by law.  
 
Education is a long-term investment, but is also very flexible and very durable. Courses 
taught on an interdisciplinary basis have the advantage of creating a semi-permanent 
interdisciplinary forum for dialogue, which in the long run is the best way of assuring a 
competent response to emerging social problems in relation to the biosphere. A 
lectureship in bio-ethics has been set up in NUI, Galway in 20004, and a chair at the 
Dublin Molecular Medicine Center (TCD and UCD) in 2001. Medical ethics has been 
taught in medical schools for a number of years. The literature available as teaching 
material is virtually infinite, even if of varying quality. 
 
The political facilitation of the restoration of ethics includes the establishment of ethical 
committees. Given that NUIM has launched its degree in biotechnology, it is probably 
necessary to establish one here, in so far as potential investors, funding agencies and 
publishers might require or request it5. It might also be a wise precaution to take, in order 
to address problems that could arise in the public. Its composition, tasks, mode of 
convocation, expected output and responsibility is, however, to consider very carefully, 
even as it must comply with varying standards set out by funding agencies6. The Royal 
Irish Academy has proposed the establishment of a National Ethics Advisory Body, in 
negotiations with the Ministry for Enterprise, Trade and Employment7. Such an advisory 
body could complement existing standard-setting authorities, and could serve as an 
important outlet for ethical tensions as well as contributing on a long-term basis to 
international debate8. Its mandate would also have to be considered carefully, as the 
creation of a ‘bio-ethical magisterium’ can provoke resentment9. Political initiatives in 
the form of committees exist also at the international level: in EU, The Council of Europe 
and Unesco10. They are what must be called ‘trend setting’ because they formulate the 
politically viable compromise between industry and the public. 
  
The international documents relating to bio-ethics also are trend setting, if not legally 
binding. The most important of these is the Council of Europe Bioethics Convention and 
its additional protocols11. EU directives relating to patenting, etc. likewise are of great 
importance, as national legal development in the member states is significantly supported 
by them. Up until now, however, it seems as if bio-ethical legislation in Ireland has been 
concerned with setting up various agencies of a regulatory nature12 and hence preserved a 
flexibility, which of course might be tested in the future. 
  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
What I have hoped to show is that bio-ethics, being what we consider it appropriate to do 
in relation to the biosphere, concerns what we do, what we consider appropriate, and who 
we are. Therefore it involves everyone and forms an indispensable part of social 
integration of any society affected by biotechnology. I also hope to have indicated the 
means by which such integration is facilitated, in teaching, politics and law. And finally I 
hope to have made you aware of your role in this integration process. 
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